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International trade and the division of labour 
 







This paper develops a model of international trade based on the division of 
labour under perfect competition. International trade, by eliminating the 
duplication of coordination costs, leads to a greater variety of intermediate 
goods, each produced at a larger scale than in autarky. The greater variety 
of intermediate inputs implies greater division of labour and hence gains 
from trade. Similarly to models of international trade under imperfect 
competition, the volume of trade depends on the relative sizes of the 
trading partners. Extending the model to two factors of production yields 
the additional result that if the two countries are sufficiently similar in 
their relative endowments, then both factors of production can experience 
gains from trade.  
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1  Introduction 
 
 “I always say there are two and a half theories of trade”.  
Paul Krugman to Peter Neary, as quoted in Neary (2010).  
 
There are three main approaches to theoretical modelling of international trade: the 
approach based on comparative advantage and perfect competition from Ricardo to 
Heckscher and Ohlin, the approach based on monopolistic competition as in 
Krugman (1979, 1980), and the approach based on oligopoly as initially developed by 
Brander (1981)1. This paper develops a new model of international trade which takes 
a different approach to the preceding literature, by focussing on the division of 
labour as the reason for international trade. The role of the division of labour in 
raising per capita incomes has been recognised since at least Adam Smith (1776)2. 
The model we develop is based on trade in intermediate inputs, which constitutes 
over half of total goods trade, as documented by Miroudot et al (2009) and Sturgeon 
and Memedovic (2010), and shares features of both the comparative advantage and 
monopolistic competition approaches. From the comparative advantage literature, it 
uses a perfectly competitive market structure; from the monopolistic competition 
literature, countries are ex ante identical to each other, so there is no comparative 
advantage reason for international trade.  
 
In our model, the division of labour is limited by both the extent of the market, and 
by coordination costs. International trade eliminates the duplication of coordination 
costs across countries, which encourages greater division of labour, and hence higher 
levels of output and welfare. Thus, similarly to models of trade based on 
monopolistic competition, we endogenise the number of varieties of intermediate 
goods produced; however, this is done under perfectly competitive markets. Because 
countries are assumed to have identical technologies in producing intermediate goods 
and there is no way of identifying individual intermediate goods, the direction of 
trade is indeterminate; however, the volume of trade is determinate, and depends on 
the relative sizes of the trading partners.  
 
Having established the main features of the model with one final good and one factor 
of production, we then proceed to extend the model to two final goods and two 
factors of production, similarly to Krugman’s (1981) extension of his earlier 
                                                          
1 The oligopolistic approach is what Neary (2010) refers to as the half theory of trade, since it is not 
as widely used as the other two approaches, despite the efforts of Neary (2009).  
2 In fact, the literature on international trade under monopolistic competition may be viewed as one 
approach to analysing the implications of the international division of labour. The model presented in 
this paper presents a different approach to this issue.  
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(Krugman 1980) model. This enables us to consider the distributional implications of 
the model. With more than one factor of production, there are now two sources of 
the gains from trade: the division of labour as in the one factor model, and relative 
endowment differences as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. As a result, it is possible, if 
the two countries are not too dissimilar from each other in their relative 
endowments, that both factors of production gain from trade. This is similar to the 
result in Krugman (1981) and in contrast to the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin result, 
where the scarce factor always loses from trade.  
 
The role of the division of labour in international trade has been developed especially 
by Ethier (1979, 1982a). In the earlier paper, the distinction is not made between 
external and internal scale economies, while the later paper is explicit in its use of 
both internal and external scale economies. Francois (1990a, 1990b) makes use of the 
production function developed by Edwards and Starr (1987) to develop a model of 
international trade in which scale economies arise from producer services in a 
monopolistic competition model. More recently, Chaney and Ossa (2013) open up the 
black box of the production function in the Krugman (1979) model of monopolistic 
competition, modelling the production process as a series of stages produced by 
teams. Becker and Murphy (1992) develop a closed economy model in which the 
extent of the division of labour is limited by the cost of coordinating inputs. This is 
similar to that used by Francois (1990a, 1990b), and is the approach adopted in the 
present paper.  
 
Because the present paper makes use of a perfectly competitive framework, it is 
different from the literature above (apart from Becker and Murphy (1992), who do 
not consider international trade). Nevertheless, we obtain some results which are 
qualitatively similar to those of models based on monopolistic competition such as 
Krugman (1979). Swanson (1999) develops a different model of the division of labour 
under perfect competition, in which a larger market enables greater specialisation 
and hence higher skill levels and output per worker via the endogenous development 
of comparative advantage. More closely related is Soo (2013), who develops a model 
of international trade based on the division of labour and comparative advantage in 
a perfectly competitive framework. Unlike Soo (2013), who makes use of comparative 
advantage to pin down the structure of production, in the present paper we focus on 
the cost of coordinating inputs that limits the extent of the division of labour.  
 
In order to close the model, we assume that the production of intermediate goods 
takes place under what Ethier (1979) refers to as national scale economies which are 
external to the firm. This is the same assumption as in most related work in this 
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area, for instance Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Panagariya (1981). Helpman 
(1984) provides an insightful survey of this literature, while Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2010) offer a recent treatment. Throughout the paper we focus on efficient 
allocations, which are those that enable the replication of the integrated equilibrium 
(see Krugman, 1987). This enables us to sidestep the fact that models with external 
scale economies exhibit multiple, inefficient and possibly unstable equilibria.  
 
The next section outlines the main building blocks of the model. Section 3 discusses 
the autarkic equilibrium, while Section 4 discusses the implications and patterns of 
international trade. Section 5 discusses the implications of alternative assumptions in 
the production of intermediate goods, while Section 6 provides some concluding 
comments.  
 
2 The model  
 
The model is set up with two countries, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝐻,𝐹𝐹 for Home and Foreign, although the 
solution method allows for easy extension to many countries. There is a single final 
good which is used in consumption. Let the representative consumer’s utility function 
be:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 ,                                             0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1.    (1) 
All markets are perfectly competitive. There are many possible intermediate goods, 
𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁. The final good is assembled from intermediate goods using the following 
production function:  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = (𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽 min�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ,                               1 < 𝛽𝛽 < 2.   (2) 
Where 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the number of intermediate goods actually produced in each country, 
and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the quantity of each intermediate good 𝑗𝑗 used in country 𝑖𝑖. The production 
function is such that the intermediate inputs are perfect complements, so that in 
equilibrium 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is always the same across intermediate inputs. This is quite a strong 
assumption, but simplifies the analysis considerably. That 𝛽𝛽 > 1 indicates the gains 
from the division of labour; the more the production process is divided into different 
stages, the larger the output of the final good3. Thus, firms will, in the absence of 
coordination costs, want to divide the production process into as many steps as 
possible; it is the coordination cost that constrains the division of labour.  
 
                                                          
3  The model is isomorphic to one in which consumers consume the intermediate goods directly. 
However, while it may be reasonable to assume division of labour in the production process, it is more 
difficult to justify on the consumption side.  
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In assembling the final good from the intermediate goods, there is a coordination cost 
that depends on the number of intermediate goods used in the production process:  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌,                                         𝜌𝜌 > 𝛽𝛽 > 1.     (3) 
The assembly process uses real resources in the sense that final output is reduced by 
the assembly cost (analogously to the “iceberg” trade costs in other papers). This cost 
is assumed to be shared by all firms producing the final good, and may be thought of 
as the cost of maintaining a production network; the more intermediate inputs there 
are, the more difficult and expensive it becomes to coordinate all the inputs. As we 
will see below, the restriction that 𝜌𝜌 > 𝛽𝛽  implies that the coordination cost rises 
more quickly in 𝑛𝑛 than the gain from the division of labour, and ensures that a larger 
country not only has a larger number of intermediate goods, but also that each 
intermediate good is produced at a larger scale.  
 
Labour is the only factor of production, and each country has an endowment of 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
units of labour. Intermediate goods are produced using labour with a production 
function that exhibits external scale economies which are national in nature (Ethier, 
1979). That is, output of an intermediate good 𝑗𝑗  in country 𝑖𝑖  depends on 
employment in that intermediate input in country 𝑖𝑖: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾,                                    𝛼𝛼 < 1,      1 < 𝛾𝛾 < 𝛽𝛽.    (4) 
Where 𝛼𝛼 < 1 is labour productivity, and 𝛾𝛾 > 1 indicates external scale economies; 
output increases more than proportionally to labour inputs. There are two reasons 
for assuming external scale economies. The first, technical reason, is that it enables 
us to pin down the number of intermediate goods actually produced; if constant 
returns to scale were assumed, each final good firm could in principle demand a 
different set of intermediate goods.  
 
A second reason for assuming external scale economies which are national in nature 
is that with international trade, the efficient, integrated equilibrium implies that 
production of each intermediate good will occur in only one country. As a result, 
international trade leads to a saving in the coordination cost of assembling the final 
good from the intermediate goods; these savings would not materialise if each 
intermediate good is produced in more than one country. This is discussed in Section 
5 below. External scale economies which are national (as opposed to international) in 
nature may be justified by appeal to Marshall’s localised external economies (see 
Krugman, 1991). Such localised economies may lead to the formation of industrial 
clusters (Porter, 1990). In the context of the present model, it is helpful to think of 
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each intermediate input as being produced by many firms in the same location, 
because of the external scale economies. Different intermediate inputs may be 
produced in the same or in different locations.  
 
Under perfect competition, normalising the wage rate to unity, and assuming average 
cost pricing (see Ethier, 1979), the zero profit condition implies that the price of each 
intermediate good is given by:   
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾−1�−1.     (5) 
Since 𝛾𝛾 > 1, the larger the employment in sector 𝑗𝑗 in country 𝑖𝑖, the lower the price; 
therefore it is more efficient for each intermediate input to be produced in only one 
country, as this maximises the scale of employment in that input in that country. 
Also, the higher is labour productivity 𝛼𝛼, the lower the price. Appendix A shows how 
equations (4) and (5) can be obtained from the production function for each perfectly 
competitive firm and the firm’s profit-maximising condition, respectively.  
 
3 Autarkic equilibrium 
 
In autarky, all domestically produced intermediate goods are used in producing the 
domestic final good, and since all intermediate goods are produced and consumed in 
equal quantities, we have:  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾 = �𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 �𝛾𝛾.     (6) 
Substituting this into the production function (2) and subtracting the assembly cost 
(3) gives the production function for final goods net of assembly cost:  
𝑄𝑄𝚤𝚤� = 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌.      (7) 
Each firm in the final good sector chooses the number of intermediate inputs to 
maximise profits. All firms are identical to each other, so total industry profits are:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝚤𝚤� −  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,      (8) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is the price of the final good, and is taken as given by the perfectly 
competitive firms. Substituting from equations (5), (6) and (7), we can rewrite the 
profit function (8) as:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌� − 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖.     (9) 
Differentiating equation (9) with respect to 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 allows us to solve for the number of 
intermediate goods produced in each economy (ignoring integer constraints)4:  
                                                          
4  It can be verified that 𝑑𝑑2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
2⁄ < 0 , so that equation (10) is indeed the profit-maximising 
expression for 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖. 
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𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = �(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾)𝜓𝜓𝜌𝜌 � 1𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽.     (10) 
Equation (10) shows that the assumption made above in equation (3) that 𝛾𝛾 < 𝛽𝛽 is 
required to generate positive values of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖. In principle, each final good producing firm 
could demand different intermediate inputs. However, because production of 
intermediate inputs occurs under external scale economies, the total number of 
intermediate goods produced will be the minimum number that will satisfy equation 
(10). That is, all final good producers will use the same intermediate goods. This is 
one of the roles played by the assumption of external scale economies.  
 
Since from equation (6) 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 =  (𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖⁄ )𝛾𝛾, we also have:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = (𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾(𝜌𝜌−𝛽𝛽)𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 � 𝜓𝜓𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾� 𝛾𝛾𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽.     (11) 
Equation (11) shows that the assumption that 𝜌𝜌 > 𝛽𝛽  implies that 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0 . 
Similarly, from equation (10), as long as 𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾 > 𝛽𝛽 (which always holds since we 
assume that 𝜌𝜌 > 𝛽𝛽 ), we have 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0 . That is, a larger country produces a 
larger number of distinct intermediate goods, and produces each of these 
intermediate goods at a larger scale. Following the terminology of the literature, a 
larger country expands both in terms of the intensive margin (more output of each 
intermediate is produced) and in terms of the extensive margin (more types of 
intermediates are produced). This gives similar results to Krugman (1979), and 
contrasts with the monopolistic competition literature based on the CES utility 
function (e.g. Krugman 1980), in which a larger country has a larger variety of 
goods, but not larger sectors. The extent of the division of labour depends on the size 
of the market as in Smith (1776), but also on the coordination cost as in Becker and 
Murphy (1992).  
 
We can also obtain the price of the final good. Setting the profit function (9) equal 
to zero and solving gives:  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾−𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌.     (12) 
From equation (10) above, a country with a larger labour force will produce a larger 
number of distinct intermediate goods. This reduces the cost of production of the 
final good because of the division of labour, and hence reduces the price of the final 




Substituting from the number of intermediate goods (10) into the net production 
function for final goods (7) and then into the consumer’s utility function (1), making 





𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌��𝜃𝜃     (13) 
Larger countries have a higher level of utility under autarky, since a larger economy 
enables greater division of labour; 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0 (note that this is the case since 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is 
also a function of 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖). It can also be shown that an innovation which reduces the cost 
of coordination (for instance, information technology) would raise utility, by 
encouraging greater division of labour; 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌 < 0⁄ .  
 
Note that the market equilibrium as described above is efficient, since it yields the 
same outcome as would be obtained by a benevolent central planner, whose objective 
is to maximise the country’s utility by choosing the optimal number of intermediate 
inputs to maximise net output. The reason for this is that the assumptions we have 
made above mean that firms internalise the effects of increasing numbers of 
intermediate inputs on their profits, as shown in equation (9). More intermediate 
inputs imply greater division of labour, but also higher coordination costs, and final 
goods firms take both effects into account when choosing the number of intermediate 
inputs.  
 
4 International trade  
 
In this section we allow for international trade in both intermediate and final goods 
between the two countries. We start by considering free international trade between 
the two countries, then extend the model to include trade frictions, and finally 
consider the pattern of trade.  
 
4.1 Free trade 
 
Similarly to Krugman (1979, 1980), international trade is equivalent to an increase in 
the size of the economy, since countries have identical technologies and there is only 
one factor of production. The crucial assumption here is that of national scale 
economies in the production of the intermediate goods. This means that, when 
international trade is allowed, the efficient allocation of resources (the integrated 
equilibrium) implies that each intermediate input is produced in only one country. 
As a result, since the two countries effectively become one market, the coordination 
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cost is shared between the two countries. Following the same steps as for the 
autarkic equilibrium, the number of intermediate goods that is consistent with profit 





𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽.     (14) 
And the output of each intermediate good is:  
𝑞𝑞𝑇𝑇 = [𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)]𝛾𝛾(𝜌𝜌−𝛽𝛽)𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 � 𝜓𝜓𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾� 𝛾𝛾𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽.    (15) 
These expressions also indicate how the model can be extended to allow for many 
countries, and the implications of such an extension. We can establish that:  
𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻
𝐴𝐴 ,𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 < 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 < 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 + 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴     (16) 
and 
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻
𝐴𝐴, 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 < 𝑞𝑞𝑇𝑇 < 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴.     (17) 
That is, the number of intermediate goods and the output of each intermediate good 
both increase compared to the autarkic number and output of each intermediate 
good. However, the increase is less than proportional to the expansion in market size 
resulting from trade liberalisation. International trade leads to an expansion on both 
the intensive and extensive margins.  
 
The representative consumer’s utility with free international trade is given by:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 = �� 1
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
� �(𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇)𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾�𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)�𝛾𝛾 − (𝜓𝜓(𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇)𝜌𝜌)��𝜃𝜃    (18) 
It can be shown that 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 > 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴; that is, there are always gains from free international 
trade. These gains arise from the fact that international trade enables countries to 
avoid duplicating the coordination cost. Whereas in autarky the coordination cost is 
shared only by domestic firms, in international trade it is shared by both domestic 
and foreign firms. This cost saving enables firms to increase the division of labour, 
thus yielding a productivity gain in the output of the final consumption good. Note 
also that since the free trade welfare is the same for all consumers in both countries 
whereas autarkic utility is higher in the larger country, we get the usual result that a 
smaller country gains more from trade than does a larger country. 
 
4.2 Trade frictions 
 
Now suppose that there are trade frictions that increase the cost of coordination in 
the presence of international trade, so that the coordination cost becomes:  
𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝜏𝜏𝜓𝜓(𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹)𝜌𝜌     (19) 
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where the superscript 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 denotes the outcome with trade frictions, and 𝜏𝜏 ≥ 1 is the 
additional coordination cost due to the frictions that arise from international trade 
(for instance, different languages or legal systems). Unlike trade costs, which affect 
only imported goods but not domestically produced goods, we assume that the trade 
friction affects both imported and domestically-produced intermediates, so has no 
impact on relative prices or demands. The additional trade friction incurred because 
of international trade must be less than the gain from spreading the coordination 
cost across countries; otherwise international trade would result in a welfare loss. 






     (20) 
and the output of each intermediate good is:  
𝑞𝑞𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = [𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)]𝛾𝛾(𝜌𝜌−𝛽𝛽)𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 �𝜏𝜏𝜓𝜓𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾� 𝛾𝛾𝜌𝜌+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽.    (21) 
The representative consumer’s utility with trade frictions is given by:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = �� 1
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
� �(𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾�𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)�𝛾𝛾 − (𝜏𝜏𝜓𝜓(𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹)𝜌𝜌)��𝜃𝜃.   (22) 
Comparing the trade-friction outcome with the free trade outcome, the free trade 
outcome has a larger number of intermediate goods, and each intermediate good is 
produced on a smaller scale. Intuitively, the trade friction increases the cost of 
coordinating inputs, so reduces the incentive for firms to divide the production 
process into more intermediate components. As a result, utility in the presence of 
trade frictions is lower than utility in free trade.   
 
Comparing the trade-friction outcome with the autarkic outcome, the number of 




𝛾𝛾.      (23) 
The output of each intermediate good is greater with trade frictions than in autarky 
if:  
𝜏𝜏 > � 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
�
𝜌𝜌−𝛽𝛽 .     (24) 





𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 .     (25) 
Condition (24) is always satisfied provided 𝜏𝜏 ≥ 1  as we have assumed, while 
conditions (23) and (25) are satisfied provided 𝜏𝜏 is not too large. If conditions (23) 
and (24) hold, then we can also establish that, similarly to the case for free trade, 
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that the number of intermediate goods and the output of each intermediate good 
both increase less than proportionally to the expansion in market size resulting from 
international trade.  
 
Note also the role of the trade friction term 𝜏𝜏 in the analysis above. It can be shown 
that 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏⁄ < 0 , 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏⁄ > 0 , and 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏⁄ < 0. That is, the higher the trade 
friction, the smaller the number of intermediate goods, the larger the output of each 
intermediate good, and the lower the utility from international trade. Equivalently, 
trade liberalisation which reduces 𝜏𝜏  would increase the number of intermediate 
goods, reduce the output of each intermediate good, and increase consumer welfare. 
The increase in welfare may be attributed to greater division of labour resulting from 
the increased number of intermediate goods, which in turn is caused by the falling 
coordination cost.  
 
4.3 Trade patterns 
 
The pattern of trade may be described as follows. There is no trade in the final good, 
since each country can assemble the final good using the same technology. All trade 
will be in intermediate goods. Since production of each intermediate good exhibits 
national external scale economies and technologies are identical across countries, in 
the integrated equilibrium, each intermediate good will be produced in only one 
country. The number of intermediate goods produced by each country will be 
proportional to its share of world labour supply: 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)⁄ . And since prices are 
the same across countries and preferences are homothetic, each country’s demand for 
each intermediate good is proportional to its national income. Hence the volume of 
trade is equal to (since we normalise 𝑤𝑤 = 1):  
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 =  𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
.      (25) 
This expression is identical to the expression for the volume of trade in Krugman 
(1979, 1980), and for the same reason: there are gains from increased variety 
(intermediates in the present paper, final goods in Krugman 1979, 1980). The volume 
of trade is maximised for a given total size of the world economy when the two 
countries have the same size. The larger is a country’s trading partner, the more 
varieties of intermediate goods it will import from this trading partner. However, and 
again similarly to Krugman (1979, 1980), the direction of trade is indeterminate, 





5 Alternative assumptions for the production of intermediate goods 
 
In developing the model, we have made use of the assumption that production of 
intermediate goods takes place under conditions of national scale economies which 
are external to the firm. Because of the external scale economies, the fewest possible 
varieties of intermediate goods are produced which is consistent with the equilibrium. 
Because the scale economies are national in nature, each intermediate good is 
produced in only one country in the integrated equilibrium, and this pins down the 
volume of trade. In this section we discuss the implications of making alternative 
assumptions for the production of intermediate goods.  
 
Perhaps the most natural alternative assumption to make on the production of 
intermediate goods is to assume constant returns to scale. That is, let the output of 
each intermediate good be linearly related to the amount of labour used in its 
production:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.      (26) 
This of course is equivalent to setting 𝛾𝛾 = 1 in equation (4). Careful examination of 
the results in the previous sections will show that, apart from simplifying the 
expressions somewhat, all the main results remain valid.  
 
However, the mechanism by which the model operates – that international trade 
allows for the production of each intermediate good to be concentrated and hence 
leads to gains from reduced coordination costs – does not operate in this case. Under 
constant returns to scale, with identical technologies across countries, the location of 
production of intermediate inputs does not matter. But if each intermediate input is 
produced in both countries, the duplication of coordination costs cannot be avoided. 
As a result, there would be no gains from trade! To generate gains from trade, what 
would be required is an additional assumption, that with international trade, each 
intermediate input is produced in only one country. This is satisfied by the 
assumption made in previous sections that intermediate goods are exhibit external 
scale economies, provided we focus on the case of the efficient, integrated 
equilibrium.   
 
The other possible assumption to make about intermediate goods production is that 
it takes place under international as opposed to national scale economies. Thus, 
instead of equation (3), the output of an intermediate good 𝑗𝑗 is now a function of the 
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total labour used anywhere in the world in that intermediate input (note the 
omission of the country subscript 𝑖𝑖):  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾.      (27) 
Under this assumption, once again the location of production of each intermediate 
input does not matter; a firm can produce an intermediate input anywhere in the 
world and still benefit from the international scale economies. Therefore, this leads to 
the same problem as faced by assuming constant returns to scale – that because 
production of intermediates may be dispersed, the cost saving of removing the 
duplication of the production network does not materialise. Thus we can conclude 
that, for the fundamental mechanism of the model to work, external scale economies 
which are national in nature are essential.  
 
6 Two factors of production and the distribution of income 
 
In the previous sections the model was set up to have only one factor of production. 
This made the mechanism underlying the model more transparent, but at the same 
time limits the scope of the model. In this section we extend the model to introduce 
two different final goods and two factors of production, and explore the implications 
for trade and the gains from trade. In the interests of simplicity, we focus on a 
special case of the model in which each final good is produced using a different set of 
intermediate goods, which in turn are produced using only one of the two factors of 
production. The basic structure of the model bears close similarity to the analysis of 
the model of monopolistic competition with different factors of production in 
Krugman (1981).  
 
Now there are two homogeneous final goods, 1 and 2. Suppose that utility takes the 
following Cobb-Douglas form5:  
𝑈𝑈 = 𝐶𝐶1𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶21−𝜃𝜃,                                         0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1.   (28) 
There are two types of labour, 1 and 2. Final good 1 is produced using intermediate 
inputs which are produced using type 1 labour, while final good 2 is produced using 
intermediate inputs which are produced using type 2 labour. The two sectors are 
assumed to share the same production technologies in both intermediate and final 
goods stages. As a result of this structure, the production side of both final goods are 
decoupled from each other, and in each sector the autarkic and trading equilibria 
remain as in Sections 3 and 4 above.  
                                                          
5 This is slightly more general than the utility function used in Krugman (1981), where he assumes 




To focus attention on the implications of relative factor endowments, we follow 
Krugman (1981) and let each country be endowed with the following amounts of the 
two types of labour (with an asterisk denoting Foreign values):  
𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐿𝐿2∗ = 2 − 𝑧𝑧,                               𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿1∗ = 𝑧𝑧,                     0 < 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 1.  (29) 
Hence each country has a total of 2 units of labour, the two countries are symmetric 
in terms of their relative endowments, and the world has equal amounts of the two 
types of labour.  
 
The interaction between the two final goods occurs on the demand side. From the 







.       (30) 
Making use of this and the market clearing condition shows that expenditure on each 
good is a constant fraction of total expenditure in the economy:  
𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶1 = 𝜃𝜃(𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝐶𝐶2),                               𝑃𝑃2𝐶𝐶2 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝐶𝐶2).  (31) 
Since each final good is produced using only one type of labour, the expenditure 
share of each final good is also the income share of the labour used in producing that 





𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾�(2 − 𝑧𝑧)𝛼𝛼�𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻2𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻2𝜌𝜌 �1−𝜃𝜃.  (32) 
And therefore the utility of each type of worker is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻1
𝐴𝐴 = � 𝜃𝜃
2−𝑧𝑧
� �𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻1





𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾�(2 − 𝑧𝑧)𝛼𝛼�𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻2𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻2𝜌𝜌 �1−𝜃𝜃. (34) 
In free trade, since the world has identical endowments of the two types of labour, 








∗ = 𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃.     (35) 
Since each final good uses only one type of labour, factor price equalisation (FPE) is 
always achieved, since the FPE set spans the entire endowment space. Hence, 
𝑤𝑤1 = 𝑤𝑤1∗  and 𝑤𝑤2 = 𝑤𝑤2∗ . Given identical technologies for producing the final goods 
from the intermediate goods, and for producing the intermediate goods from each 









.     (36) 
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Hence relative wages depend on the share of each final good in consumer 
expenditure. National income in the two countries is the sum of labour income, 
which, substituting from (36) and setting 𝑤𝑤2 = 1 gives:  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿1 + 𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2 = 𝜃𝜃(2−𝑧𝑧)+(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑧𝑧1−𝜃𝜃  .    (37) 
𝑌𝑌∗ = 𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿1∗ + 𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2∗ = 𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧+(1−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝑧𝑧)1−𝜃𝜃 .    (38) 
Since preferences are homothetic and prices are equalised under free trade, each 
country consumes the same proportion of the two goods, and the proportion is 
determined by the share of national income in world income. Hence, Home’s 
consumer’s utility under free trade is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = � 𝑌𝑌
2(𝑌𝑌+𝑌𝑌∗)� �𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇1𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇2𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇2𝜌𝜌 �1−𝜃𝜃.  (38) 
Each type of labour still gets a fraction of world income proportional to 𝜃𝜃, but each 
country’s share of this income is now proportional to the country’s share of that type 










𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇1𝜌𝜌 �𝜃𝜃�𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇2𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾 − 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇2𝜌𝜌 �1−𝜃𝜃.  (40) 
The ratio of the autarkic utility (32), (33) and (34) to the free trade utility (38), (39) 
and (40) shows whether the country and each type of labour experiences gains from 
trade. Unfortunately, these ratios do not simplify. Figure 1 shows how the gains from 
trade vary with the relative endowment parameter 𝑧𝑧.  
 
Figure 1: The gains from trade for the Home country.  
 



















When 𝑧𝑧 = 1, the two countries have identical relative endowments. In this case, the 
only source of the gains from trade is the division of labour. The Home country 
experiences overall gains from trade, and both types of labour experience the same 
gain. As 𝑧𝑧  decreases, the Home country becomes relatively more type-1 labour 
abundant. Type 1 labour experiences greater gains from trade, while type 2 labour’s 
gains decrease, until after a certain point, it starts to experience losses from trade. 
Hence, similarly to Krugman (1981), when the two countries’ relative endowments 
are sufficiently similar to each other, both factors of production can gain from trade.  
 
Also, from Figure 1, the Home country’s overall gains from trade increase as relative 
endowments become more different between the two countries. Now there are two 
sources of the gains from trade: the division of labour, and comparative advantage in 
the form of differences in relative factor endowments. It is possible to decompose the 
total gains from trade into the component derived from the division of labour (where 
𝑧𝑧 = 1 ), and the component derived from relative endowment differences. For 
example, in Figure 1, when 𝑧𝑧 = 0.5, the gains from the division of labour are equal to 
1.36, while the gains from relative endowment differences are equal to 1.23, for an 
overall gain of 1.67.  
 
Hence, returning to the effect of international trade on the relatively scarce labour 
(type 2 in the Home country), when relative endowments are sufficiently similar, the 
gain from the division of labour more than offsets the loss from being the relatively 
scarce factor of production (this loss arising from the fact that the scarce factor is 
relatively less scarce in the free trade equilibrium, and thus experiences a fall in its 
real return). However, when relative endowments are sufficiently different, the 
decrease in the real return to the scarce factor as a result of international trade more 
than offsets the gain from the division of labour, leading to an overall loss for the 
scarce factor.  
 
6.1 Trade patterns 
 
As in section 4.3 above, there is no trade in final goods, since assembly of each final 
good does not depend on its location, hence may be assumed to be assembled locally 
to consumption. In each sector, each country produces a number of intermediate 
inputs which is proportional to its endowment of the labour used in that sector. 
Hence Home will produce a fraction (2 − 𝑧𝑧) 2⁄  of the total number of type 1 
intermediate inputs, and a fraction 𝑧𝑧 2⁄  of the total number of type 2 intermediate 
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inputs. Since preferences are homothetic, each country demands a fraction of each 
intermediate input which is proportional to its share of world income. Hence the 
value of the Home country’s exports and imports of the two types of intermediate 
inputs are:  
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡1𝐻𝐻 = �2−𝑧𝑧2 � 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌∗                     𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡2𝐻𝐻 = �𝑧𝑧2� (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑌𝑌∗  (41) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡1𝐻𝐻 = �𝑧𝑧2� 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌                          𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡2𝐻𝐻 =  �2−𝑧𝑧2 � (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑌𝑌  (42) 
Trade is balanced; total exports equal total imports. The total value of exports 
depends on relative endowments and consumer preferences:  
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = �1
2
� [𝜃𝜃(2 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝑧𝑧(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]𝑌𝑌∗ = [𝜃𝜃(2−𝑧𝑧)+𝑧𝑧(1−𝜃𝜃)][𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧+(1−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝑧𝑧)]
2(1−𝜃𝜃)   (43) 
Note that, provided 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 0.5, 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧⁄ > 0; the more similar are the two countries in 
their relative endowments, the larger will be the total volume of trade between them. 
Trade may be divided into the component which is inter-industry in nature 
(exporting type 1 intermediates in exchange for type 2 intermediates), and the 
component which is intra-industry in nature (simultaneously exporting and 
importing the same type of intermediate). An index of intra-industry trade is given 
by the Grubel-Lloyd (1975) index, defined for each sector as:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = 1 − |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸|
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸+𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
     (44) 
Larger values of this index imply greater intra-industry trade as a fraction of total 
trade. Substituting from equations (41) and (42), we get:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = 2𝑧𝑧𝑌𝑌(2−𝑧𝑧)𝑌𝑌∗+𝑧𝑧𝑌𝑌 = 2𝑧𝑧[𝜃𝜃(2−𝑧𝑧)+(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑧𝑧](2−𝑧𝑧)[𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧+(1−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝑧𝑧)]+𝑧𝑧[𝜃𝜃(2−𝑧𝑧)+(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑧𝑧]   (45) 
That is, the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade depends on consumer 
preferences and relative endowments. It can be shown that 𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧⁄ > 0; the more 
similar are the two countries in their relative endowments, the greater the share of 
trade which is intra-industry in nature. Note that if 𝜃𝜃 = 0.5 as in Krugman (1981), 
then we get exactly the same results as Krugman does: total exports will be equal to 0.5 × 𝑌𝑌∗, and the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade will be equal to 𝑧𝑧, the 




This paper develops a simple model of international trade based only on the division 
of labour; there is no comparative advantage or imperfect competition. Firms 
assemble final goods from intermediate inputs, and there are gains to having a larger 
variety of intermediate inputs. The extent of the division of labour is limited by the 
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cost of coordinating intermediate inputs and the size of the market. International 
trade eliminates the duplication of coordination costs, resulting in an increased 
variety of intermediate inputs, greater division of labour, and hence to gains from 
trade. Extending the basic one-factor model to two factors of production, we obtain 
the result that, if relative endowments are sufficiently similar between the two 
countries, then both factors of production will benefit from trade. This is in contrast 
with the traditional factor endowments model, in which the scarce factor of 
production loses from trade, and arises because, when the basic model is combined 
with the factor endowments model, there are now two sources of the gains from 
trade: from the division of labour, and from comparative advantage.  
 
The model represents an alternative treatment to the issue of scale economies and 
the division of labour in international trade to the now-conventional monopolistic 
competition approach pioneered by Krugman (1979, 1980) among others. In the 
conventional approach, there are scale economies which are internal to the firm; as a 
result, there are only a limited number of firms in the market, and each firm is 
associated with a different variety of the good. There, the division of labour occurs 
across firms. In the current model, the division of labour occurs within firms, but is 
constrained by the coordination cost. Some of the results we obtain are similar to 
those in Krugman (1979), and contrast with those in Krugman (1980): international 
trade leads to an increase in both the number of intermediate goods, and the scale of 
production of each intermediate good. Similarly, when extending the basic model to 
two factors of production, we obtain results which are similar to those obtained in 
Krugman’s (1981) extension of the monopolistic competition model to more than one 
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Appendix A: Further details of the production function for intermediate 
goods  
 
First we establish that the production function for an intermediate good given in 
equation (4) can be derived from the production function of each firm producing that 
intermediate good (see Panagariya, 1981). The production function for a firm 𝑘𝑘 
producing intermediate good 𝑗𝑗  in country 𝑖𝑖  depends on the total output of that 
intermediate good:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘     (A1) 
Total output of intermediate good 𝑗𝑗 is:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 11−𝛿𝛿 = �𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾   (A2) 
Where 𝛾𝛾 =  1 (1 − 𝛿𝛿)⁄ .  
 
Next, we solve for the prices of the intermediate goods. Under perfect competition, 
each firm employs labour so that the value marginal product of labour is equal to the 
wage rate. Differentiating equation (A1) with respect to 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 gives:  
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿     (A3) 
Hence, we have:  
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿       (A4) 
Setting the wage rate equal to unity, we can solve for the price of each intermediate 
good as:  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 �−1 = �𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾−1�−1   (A5) 
Which is equation (5) in the text. These results hold in both autarky and 
international trade, with the only difference being that the labour used in each 
intermediate good, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , differs between autarky and international trade. Note that 
equation (A5) also shows that, although each firm practices marginal cost pricing, at 
the industry level, average cost pricing is being practiced; average cost for the 
industry is (substituting from equation (A2)) 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ =  �𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾−1�−1.  
 
 
